We consider an investment problem in which an investor performs capital injections to increase the liquidity of a firm for it to maximise profit from market operations. Each time the investor performs an injection, the investor incurs a fixed transaction cost. In addition to maximising their terminal reward, the investor seeks to minimise risk of loss of their investment (from a possible firm ruin) by exiting the market at some point in time. We show that the problem can be reformulated in terms of a new stochastic differential game of control and stopping in which one of the players modifies a (jump-)diffusion process using impulse controls and an adversary chooses a stopping time to end the game. We show that the value of this game can be computed by solving a double obstacle problem described by a quasi-variational inequality. We then characterise the value of the game via a set of HJBI equations, considering both games with zero-sum and non-zero-sum payoff structures. Our last result demonstrates that the solution to the investment problem is recoverable from the Nash equilibrium strategies of the game.
Introduction
There are numerous environments in which financial agents incur fixed or minimal costs when adjusting their investment positions; trading environments with transaction costs, real options pricing and real estate and large-scale infrastructure investing are a few important examples. The study of optimal investments by an economic agent who seeks to minimise the probability that they go bankrupt within their lifetime is known as the probability of lifetime ruin problem. The problem was introduced by [MR00] and studied in depth by [You04] .
Despite the breadth of the literature concerning the lifetime ruin problem and the widespread occurrence and influence of transaction costs on investment behaviour, current models within the literature have yet to include those in which the investor faces financial transaction costs
1 . The absence of transaction costs within the theoretical analysis limits the scope of application of the lifetime ruin model to a wide number of instances within financial systems. The objective of this paper is therefore to generalise the lifetime ruin problem to problems the investor now faces transaction costs when modifying their position.
In order to tackle this problem, we introduce a new stochastic differential game of control and stopping in which the controller uses impulse controls to modify the dynamics of a (jump-)diffusion process and show that this theoretical framework represents the theoretical abstraction of the investment problem which we later to use generate solutions to the problem.
We specifically concern ourselves with an optimal firm liquidity control problem with lifetime ruin in which an investor performs capital injections to increase the liquidity of a firm. In this instance, the investor seeks to maximise his capital injections to buoy the firm's liquidity process whilst seeking to minimise the probability of loss of investment by exiting the market (selling all firm holdings).
Our analysis shows that by representing the investment problem as stochastic differential game of control and stopping with impulse controls enables the optimal solution of the problem to be computed. A significant component of this paper is therefore concerned with studying the stochastic game which leads to a full characterisation the value of the game using PDEs (HJBI equations). We then generalise the results to cover the game with a non-zero-sum payoff structure and generalise the results to provide a characterisation of the Nash equilibrium of the non-zero-sum game. To complete our study, we lastly show that the solution to the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin with transaction costs can be recovered from the equilibria of the non-zero-sum stochastic differential game enabling the optimal solution for the investement problem to be computed using solutions to a joint set of PDEs.
Theoretical Background
Impulse control problems are stochastic control models in which the cost of control is bounded below by some fixed positive constant which prohibits continuous control, thus augmenting the problem to one of finding both an optimal sequence of times to apply the control policy, in addition to determining optimal control magnitudes. We refer the reader to [EBY11a] as a general reference to impulse control theory and to [VLVP07; PS10] for articles on applications. Additionally, matters relating to the application of impulse control models have been surveyed extensively in [Kor99] . Impulse control frameworks therefore underpin the description of financial environments with transaction costs and liquidity risks and more generally, applications of optimal control theory in which the system dynamics are modified by a sequence of discrete actions.
Stochastic differential games with impulse control (in which two players modify the system dynamics) have recently appeared in the stochastic impulse control literature. Deterministic versions of a game in were first studied by [Yon94; TY93] -in the model presented in [Yon94] , impulse controls are restricted to use by one player and the other uses continuous control. Similarly, in [Zha11] stochastic differential games in which one player uses impulse control and the other uses continuous controls were studied. Using a verification argument, the conditions under which the value of game is a solution to a HJBI equation is also shown in [Zha11] . In [Cos12] , a stochastic differential game in which both players use impulse control is analysed using viscosity theory.
Problems that combine both discretionary stopping and stochastic optimal control have attracted much attention over recent years; in particular there is a notable amount of literature on models of this kind in which a single controller uses absolutely continuous controls to modify the system dynamics. Discretionary stopping and stochastic optimal control problems in which the controller exercises modifications through the drift component of the state process (using absolutely continuous controls) have been studied by [KO02; Ben92; KS99a; KW00]. Another version of these problems which has attracted significant interest is problems in which the controller acts to modify the system dynamics by finite variations of the state process -such problems have been studied by [DZ94; IKW00] .
A related family of models has recently emerged in which the task of controlling the system dynamics and exit time is divided between two players who act according to separated interests [OkB13a; NZ14] . Controller-Stopper games were introduced by Maitra & Sudderth in [MS96] , however, the game remains to be studied extensively notwithstanding notable papers such as [KS99b] who study a game in which the underlying system dynamics are given by a one-dimensional diffusion within a given interval in R. Other papers on the topic include [KS99b] and [BH13] ; in the latter, a multidimensional model is studied wherein the state process is controlled on a diffusion in a multidimensional Euclidean space. A gametheoretic approach to stochastic optimal control problems with discretionary stopping has been used to analyse the lifetime ruin problem in [BY11a; OkB13a; NZ14] amongst others.
Within these models, the task of controlling the investment process and selecting the market exit time is assigned to two individual players who each seek to maximise some form of the same objective payoff functional. Game-theoretic formulations of the optimal stochastic control with discretionary stopping model can be viewed as generalised versions of the single controller models wherein the investor is now allowed to seek multiple objectives which are each defined over multiple payoff functions.
Within the body of literature concerning stochastic differential games of control and stopping however, the set of controller is restricted to an absolutely continuous class of controls (e.g. [EBY11b; EBY11a; MS96; KS99b; KZ08] ). This renders the aforementioned models unsuitable for prescribing solutions for investment problems with fixed minimal costs as continuous adjustments would result in immediate ruin.
Organisation
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2, we give a complete description of the optimal liquidity control problem and construct the main investment model of the paper. In section 3, we give a technical description of the game and introduce some of the underlying concepts required in the script. In section 4 we prove some preliminary results that underpin the main analysis which is performed in sections 5, 6 and 7 though we postpone some of the technical proofs of section 4 to the appendix. In section 5, we study the controller-stopper game with impulse controls with a jump-diffusion process and prove a verification result. In section 6, we generalise the results of section 5 to non-zero-sum games. In section 7 we apply the results of section 5 to derive the optimal investment strategies the model in section 2.
We initiate the paper with the optimal liquidity control with lifetime ruin problem that the model studied in this paper addresses; however, the general results found in the paper are broadly applicable. The problem is one of minimising the probability of lifetime ruin whilst maximising some utility criterion. For a complete treatment of the background and origins of this problem, we refer the reader to [OkB13a; NZ14; BY11b] and references therein.
The following presentation of the problem is loosely based on the problems presented in [BY11b; Mk07; JMZ09].
Investment Problem
We concern ourselves with the lifetime ruin problem within an investment context. The objective of this section is to develop a framework through which the optimal policies of a probability of lifetime ruin model in which (fixed) transaction costs are present can be characterised.
The problem of how an investor should inject capital to raise a firm's liquidity process in order to maximise the investor's terminal reward is known as the optimal capital injections problem. In this environment, the investor injects capital into the firm to increase available liquidity in order that the firm be able to pursue its market objectives.
The central task of the optimal liquidity control problem is to characterise the optimal sequence of timing and magnitude of the capital injections to be performed by the investor. The problem of when capital injections should be performed (and when dividends should be paid) by the firm is an area of active research within theoretical actuarial science to which a great deal of attention has been focused. Current models within the literature, the optimal capital injections and dividends model is represented as a single-player impulse control problem in which the controller seeks the optimal sequence of capital injections. In [Kor99] a model in which the firm can seek to raise capital (by issuing new equity) to be injected so as to allow the firm to remain solvent is considered. We refer the reader to [Kor99] and [Zer10] and references therein for exhaustive discussions.
The problem we address in this section is one in which a firm investor seeks to both maximise the availability of liquidity to the firm whilst minimising the risk of loss of investment due to firm ruin. Following the notion of ruin in classical ruin theory, we define ruin as the first time at which some surplus process (or liquidity process) goes negative.
In the problem we study, the investor faces transaction costs so that and each capital injection incurs some fixed minimal cost.The investor seeks to maximise their terminal returns by performing the maximal sequence of capital injections at selected times that their wealth process can tolerate. However, the investor also seeks an optimal time to exit the market by selling all firm holdings before firm bankruptcy.
In the following construction, we formulate the optimal liquidity control and the lifetime ruin problem as a stochastic differential game in which two players each seek to fulfil one of the investor's objectives. Some of the ideas for the following description of the problem are loosely adapted from the (continuous control) descriptions of problem presented in [BY11a; Mk07] .
Description of The Problem
We now provide a description of the lifetime ruin and optimal liquidity control problems. First we outline the key features of the general problem. In particular we will introduce three separate processes, namely the firm's liquidity process and the investor's wealth process after which we will be in a position to construct a complete description of the problem. Finally, we will describe the problem with fixed or minimally bounded costs which defines the problem we wish to solve.
We start firstly by describing the firm's liquidity process X s = X(s, ω) ∈ R × Ω at time s ∈ [t, T ] -a stochastic process defined over some time horizon T ∈]0, +∞[. When there are no capital injections, the firm's liquidity process evolves according to the following expression:
where x ∈ R is the firm's initial surplus, e ∈ R + is a constant that describes the firm's rate of expenditure and r ∈ (0, 1) is the firm's rate of return on capital. The term S f (s) captures the stochasticity of the firm's liquidity process and is given by
, and B f (s) ∈ R which is a 1−dimensional standard Brownian motion; coupled with the functions 2 σ f : [t, T ] × R → R and γ f : R × R → R. Each time the investor performs a capital injection, the investor incurs a cost -the cost function c associated to the injections is given by c(τ, z) := exp −δτ (κ I + (1 + λ)z) , where κ I is a fixed transaction cost and the parameter λ > 0 determines the proportional cost for an injection of size z. Since performing continuous actions would result in immediate bankruptcy, the investor's capital injections must be performed over a discrete sequence of investments.
The investor therefore performs a sequence of capital injections {z k } k∈Z over the horizon of the problem which are performed over a sequence of intervention times {τ k (ω)} k∈N . We denote the investor's control by the double sequence (τ, Z) ≡ j∈N z j · 1 {τj ≤T } ∈ Φ where the set Z is a feasible set of investor capital injections and T ⊆ [t, T ] is the set of intervention times and Φ ⊆ T × Z.
Denote by e ∈ R + the proportion of capital flows expended by the firm and by T (τ,Z) s := m≥1 z m · 1 {τm<τS ∧s} -the investor's capital injections process. With capital injections, the firm liquidity at time s ∈ [t, T ] is then given by the following expression:
P−a.s.. In order to complete the description of the investor's problem we construct the notion of risk of ruin facing the investor. As in [OkB13b] and in the sense given by [PAH98; FS02a] , let θ be a convex risk measure, then we can write the risk measure associated to the problem is given by:
where M a is some family of measures s.th. Q ≪ P and where E Q denotes the expectation w.r.t. Q ∈ M a and χ : M a → R is some convex (penalty) function. Since the investor seeks to minimise risk of null returns, the investor seeks to exit the market by selling all holdings at a point ρ(Ω) ∈ T that minimises the risk θ(X) of the investor's returns falling below m (after firm ruin) before T , where ρ ∈ T where T ⊆ [t, T ] is a set of F −measurable stopping times. From now on we will consider only the case m = 0.
We now observe that since the investor seeks to exit the market in advance of firm ruin, we can describe the investor's optimal stopping problem by the following representation
where the function χ : M a → R is a given function 3,4 . The firm's liquidity process is therefore raised by capital injections performed by the investor, however in performing capital injections, the investor's wealth is reduced since liquidity is transferred from investor to firm. The investor however receives a return on capital through some running stream and some terminal reward after liquidating all holdings in the firm.
The investor's wealth at time s ≤ T is Y s = Y (s, ω) is a stochastic process; denote by π ∈ [0, 1] the portion of the investor's wealth invested in risky assets and byT
{τm<τS∧s} which is the total deductions from the investor's wealth process due to the injections, then Y s is given by the following:
where δ, r 0 , µ R ∈ R ∈ R are constants describing that are the investor's discount rate, the interest rate and the expected rate of return on the risky assets. The constant Γ is given by Γ :
ds is a compensated F −Poisson random measure and B I (s) ∈ R is a 1−dimensional standard Brownian motion.
If we now interpret optimality of the stopping time ρ(Ω) in a sense of risk-minimal w.r.t. the risk measure θ we can reformulate the problem in (4) and the investor's maximisation problem in terms of a decoupled pair of objective functions. Focusing firstly on the investor's capital injection problem, we can write the problem as:
Find an admissible strategy (τ ,Ẑ) ∈ Φ s.th.:
where
The following expression represents the investor's optimal stopping problem which seeks an optimal time to exit the market:
Find an admissible strategyρ ∈ T s.th.:
The expressions (7) and (9) fully express the investor's set of objectives. We can combine the expressions (7) and (9) to construct a single objective function Π given by the following expression
Find an admissible strategy (ρ, (τ ,Ẑ)) ∈ T × Φ s.th.:
(τ ,Ẑ) ∈ arg sup
3 We observe that the problem in (4) can be viewed as a zero-sum game between two players; namely a player that controls the measure Q which may be viewed as an adverse market and the investor who selects the stopping time ρ ∈ T . Games of this type are explored in [NZ14] and [Mk07] . 4 We shall hereon specialise to the case χ ≡ 0 in which case the risk measure θ is called coherent where
It can now be seen that the problem is now to find the interdependent set (ρ, (τ ,Ẑ)) ∈ T × Φ. If we now think of the two objectives (7) and (9) as being assigned to two individual players, we recognise the pair of problems (7) and (9) as jointly representing a stochastic differential game of control and stopping in which the controller modifies the system dynamics using impulse controls.
The problem involves a risk-minimising investor seeks to maximise their liquidity input into the firm through capital injections whilst seeking an optimal exit time with concern for a suboptimal early ruin. The underlying structure of the model is a stochastic differential game of control and stopping in which the investor has dual objectives. Each of the investor's objectives is delegated to an individual player who plays in such a way as to maximise their own objective whilst seeking an optimal response to the other player.
In section 5, we provide a PDE characterisation of a general formulation of stochastic differential games of control and stopping involving impulse controls. We then apply the results to show that the optimal investment strategy for the problem can be recovered from the (saddle point) equilibrium strategies of a stochastic differential game of control and stopping with impulse controls.
Current Literature
Since its introduction to the literature, a considerable amount of work has been dedicated to the study of the lifetime ruin problem in addition to a number of variants of the problem. Variations of the original problem include models with stochastic consumption [BY11a] , stochastic volatility [EBY11b] , ambiguity aversion [EBY11a] amongst many other works. Clearly, the probability of lifetime ruin model can be extended to address an analogous problem within the context of an investor who holds some portfolio of risky assets who seeks to both maximise their return whilst finding the optimal time to exit the market.
A common approach to study the lifetime ruin problem is to model the problem as an optimal stochastic control problem in which the controller seeks both an optimal investment strategy (modelled using absolutely continuous controls) and an optimal time to sell all market holdings. Thus, in general the lifetime ruin problem in which the investor also seeks to maximise their returns can be formulated as an optimal stochastic control problem with discretionary stopping.
In general, lifetime ruin problems in which the investor also seeks to maximise some performance criterion can be reformulated as stochastic differential games. The intuition behind this is that given a sufficient player aversion to lifetime ruin, nature can be viewed as a second player with the first player responding to nature's actions in such a way that seeks to avoid the occurrence of lifetime ruin.
In [BY11a] , it is shown that the single investor portfolio problem in a Black-Scholes market in which an investor seeks to both maximise a running reward and minimise the probability of lifetime bankruptcy exhibits duality with controller-stopper games. Indeed, in [BY11a] it is shown that the value function of the investment problem is the convex dual of the value of a controller-stopper game. Similarly, in [OkB13a] an investor portfolio problem with discretionary stopping is analysed by studying an optimal stopping-stochastic control differential game and proving an equivalence.
In [OkB13a] , the value for a game in which the stopper seeks to minimise a convex risk measure defined over a common (zero-sum) payoff objective is characterised in terms of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Variational Inequality (HJBVI) to which it is proven that the value is a viscosity solution. The inclusion of a convex risk measure, as outlined in [78] , [79] , serves as a means by which risk attitudes of the investor are encapsulated into the model, furthermore, the zero-sum payoff structure of the model implies that the strategies are appropriate for the extraction of optimal strategies in worst-case scenario analyses.
Contributions
This paper introduces a controller-stopper game in which the controller uses impulse controls; the results cover a general setting in which the underlying state process is a jump diffusion process. We extend existing game-theoretic impulse control results to now cover games in which i) the underlying state process is a jump-diffusion process and in contrast to [Cos12] ii) the payoff is no longer restricted to a zero-sum structure.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to deal with a jump-diffusion process within a stochastic differential game in which the players use impulse controls to modify the state process. Lastly, also to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide results pertaining to a non-zero-sum payoff structure within stochastic differential games for a controller-stopper game in which impulse controls used.
A related paper to the current is [OkB13a] in which conditions for a HJBI equation are proved for controller-stopper games in which the controller uses continuous controls.
In the following section we describe the details of a general version of the controllerstopper game thereafter, we prove two key results: we firstly prove a set of verification theorems that characterise the conditions for a HJBI equation in non-zero-sum and zerosum games. As in the Dynkin game case and controller-controller case, the HJBI equation is an obstacle problem in particular, the HJBI equation is an obstacle quasi-variational inequality.
We begin by giving a canonical description of the game dynamics, starting with the zero sum game. The Dynamics: Canonical Description Let C(U ; G) be the set of continuous functions from some set U ⊆ R to a field G. The index s ∈ [t, τ S ] is time which runs continuously over some random and possibly finite time horizon τ S . We denote the coordinate mapping on 
is a Lévy measure; bothÑ (ds, dz) and B(s) are supported by the filtered probability space and F is the filtration of the probability space(Ω, P, F = {F s } s∈[t,τS] ). We assume that N and B are independent. As in [TY93] , we note that the above specification of the filtration ensures stochastic integration and hence, the controlled jump diffusion is well defined (this is proven in [Zha11] ).
We suppose then that the uncontrolled passive state
X ∈ S ⊆ R p the state process obeys the following SDE:
The generator of X (the uncontrolled process) is:
where I is the integro-differential operator defined by:
The state process is influenced by impulse controls u ∈ U exercised by player I where
The impulses {ξ i } ∈ Z ⊂ S are exercised by player I who intervenes at F −measurable stopping times {τ i } where t < τ 1 < τ 2 < . . . < and where S ⊆ R p is a given set. We assume U ⊆ R p is a convex cone which is the set of admissible control actions for player I and Z is the set of admissible impulse values. Indeed, if we suppose that an impulse ζ ∈ Z determined by some admissible policy w is applied at some F −measurable stopping time τ when the state is x ′ = X t,x0,· (τ −), then the state
We assume that the impulses ξ j ∈ Z are U − valued and are F −measurable for all j ∈ N.
For notational convenience, as in [OkB13a] , we will use u = [τ j , ξ j ] j≥1 to denote the control policy u = j≥1 ξ j · 1 {τj≤τS} (s) ∈ U which consists of F −measurable stopping times {τ j } j∈N and F −measurable impulse interventions {ξ j } j∈N .
The evolution of the state process with interventions is described by the equation:
for all r ∈ [t, τ S ]; P−a.s. The game is s.th. player II can choose some F −measurable stopping time ρ ∈ [t, τ S ] at which point the process is stopped and both players receive a terminal cost (reward) G(X). Player I has a cost function which is also the player II gain (or profit) function. The corresponding payoff functions are given by the following expression which player I (resp., player II) minimises (resp., maximises):
where x := (t, x 0 ) and where the functions f :
R are deterministic functions which we shall refer to as the running cost function and the bequest function respectively.
The results contained in this paper are built exclusively under the following set of assumptions unless otherwise stated: Standing Assumptions A.1.1. Lipschitz Continuity
We assume there exist real-valued constants c µ , c σ > 0 and
p and ∀z ∈ R l we have:
A.1.2. Lipschitz Continuity
We also assume the Lipschitzianity of the running functions h, g, ψ and φ that is, we assume the existence of real-valued constants c h , c g , c ψ , c φ > 0 s.th. ∀s ∈ [t, τ S ], ∀(x, y) ∈ R p we have for R ∈ {h, g, k, l, ψ, φ}:
A.2. Growth Conditions
We assume the existence of a real-valued constants
We also make the following assumptions on the cost function c :
Let τ, τ ′ ∈ [t, τ S ] be F −measurable stopping times s.th. t ≤ τ < τ ′ ≤ τ S and let ξ, ξ ′ ∈ Z be measurable impulse interventions. Then we assume that the following statements hold:
A.4. We also assume that the there exists a constant λ c > 0 s.th. inf ξ∈Z) c(s, ξ) ≥ λ c ∀s ∈ [t, τ S ] where ξ ∈ Z is a measurable impulse intervention.
Assumptions A.1.1 and A.2 ensure the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (13) (c.f. [BY11b] ). Assumption A.3 (i) (subadditivity) is required in the proof of the uniqueness of the value function. Assumption A.3 (ii) (the player cost function is a decreasing function in time) and may be interpreted as a discounting effect on the cost of interventions. Assumption A.1.2 is required to prove the regularity of the value function (see for example [Yon94] and for the single-player case, see for example [Mk07] ). Assumption A.3 (ii) was introduced (for the two-player case) in [JMZ09] though is common in the treatment of single-player case problems (e.g. [Mk07; OkB13a] ). Assumption A.4 is integral to the definition of the impulse control problem.
Throughout the script we adopt the following standard notation (e.g. [TY93; OkB13a; NZ14]): Notation
Let Ω be a bounded open set on R p+1 . Then we denote by:Ω -The closure of the set Ω.
where ∂ s and ∂ xi,xj denote the temporal differential operator and second spatial differential operator respectively.
The Euclidean norm to which x, y is the associated scalar product acting between two vectors belonging to some finite dimensional space.
As in [TY93] , we will use the notation u ≡ [τ j , ξ j ] j≥1 to denote the control policy u = j≥1 ξ j · 1 {τj≤τS} (s) ∈ U which consists of F −measurable stopping times {τ j } j∈N and F -measurable impulse interventions {ξ j } j∈N .
Statement of Main Results
In this paper, we prove two key results for the game that characterise the value HJBI in both zero-sum and non-zero-sum impulse controller-stopper stochastic differential games.
We prove a verification theorem (Theorem 5.1) for stochastic differential games with a jump-diffusion process and in which one of the players uses impulse controls and the other player chooses when to end the game. In doing so, we show that the value of the game must satisfy a double obstacle quasi-variational inequality:
where L is the local stochastic generator operator associated to the process (16) and M is the non-local intervention operator -we will use L to denote the local stochastic generator for the controlled process, where it will not cause confusion we will also employ the shorthand r(s, X S ) ≡ r(X S ) where r ∈ f, G -the constituent functions of the payoff function J.
In the non-zero-sum case we have the following result: Theorem 6.2. Denote by φ i the objective function for the non-zero-sum game for player i ∈ {1, 2}, then the functions φ i satisfy the following quasi-variational inequalities
Having proven these results, we then implement the analysis to prove the following set of results relating to the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin investment problem stated in section 2:
Theorem 7.1. Suppose that the firm's liquidity process x evolves according to (2) and suppose that the investor's wealth process y evolves according to (5), then the sequence of optimal capital injections (τ ,Ẑ)
by the investment times {τ j } j∈N and magnitudes {ẑ j } j∈N where [τ j ,ẑ j ] j∈N are constructed recursively via the following expressions:
The fixed duplet (ỹ,ŷ) is determined by the following equations:
where the function φ 2 is given by (93) and the function φ 2,0 is given by:
where the constants d 1 , d 2 , c ∈ R are given in (158) and (159) - (161). The investor's non-investment region is given by:
The investor exits the market atρ ∈ T where the exit time is defined by:
where the process Q(s) is determined by
and the set D 1 (non-stopping region) is defined by:
where the operator Lθ corresponds to the stochastic generator of the controlled process. Theorem 7.1 says that the investor performs discrete capital injections over a sequence of intervention times {τ k } k∈N over the time horizon of the problem. The decision to invest is determined by the investor's wealth process -in particular, at the points at which the investor's wealth process reachesỹ, then the investor performs capital injections of magnitudes {ẑ k } k∈N to increase the firm's liquidity levels in order to provide the firm with maximal liquidity to perform market operations. This in turn maximises the liquidity that the investor makes available to the firm whilst the investor remains in the market after which the investor liquidates all investment holdings. However, if the firm's liquidity process exits the region D 1 , in order to avoid the prospect of loss on investment, the investor immediately exits the market by liquidating all market holdings in the firm.
The fixed duplet (ŷ,ỹ) is determined by (21) -(23). The non-stopping region D 1 is defined by (28). The function ψ is the investor's value function and the operator Lθ is the (controlled) stochastic generator. In section 7 we provide a full characterisation of the investor's value function.
From Theorem 7.1. we also arrive at the following result that enables us to state the exact points at which the investor performs an injection, when the investor exits the market and when the investor does nothing:
Corollary 7.2. For the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin problem, the investor's wealth process x lies within a space that splits into three regions: a region in which the investor performs a capital injection -I 1 , a region in which no action is taken -I 2 and lastly a region in which the investor exits the market by selling all firm holdings -I 3 . Moreover, the three regions are characterised by the following expressions:
I 1 = {y ≥ỹ|y,ỹ ∈ S}, I 2 = {qx > ω * , y <ỹ|x, y,ỹ ∈ S; ω * , q ∈ R},
where q is the value of the process Q and the fixed duplet (ỹ,ŷ) and the value ω * are determined by (21) -(23) and (171) respectively.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to deal with a jump-diffusion process within a stochastic differential game in which the players use impulse controls to modify the state process. Additionally, to our knowledge, this is the first game that involves impulse controls in which the role of one of the players is to stop the game at a desirable point.
We now give some definitions which we shall need to describe the system dynamics modified by impulse controls:
Definition 4.1. Denote by T (t,τ ′ ) the set of all F −measurable stopping times in the interval [t, τ ′ ], where τ ′ is some stopping time s.th. τ ′ ≤ τ S , if τ ′ = τ S then we will denote by T ≡ T (t,
We shall hereon use the symbol U (resp., T -which belongs to the set of all F −measurable stopping times in [t, τ S ]) to denote the set of admissible controls for player I (resp., player II). Given two player I controls u ∈ U and u ′ ∈ U; we interpret the notion
We denote by
Strategies
A player strategy is a map from the other player's set of controls to the player's own set of controls. An important feature of the players' strategies is that they are non-anticipative -neither player may guess in advance, the future behavior of other players given his current information.
We formalise this condition by constructing non-anticipative strategies which were used in the viscosity solution approach to differential games in [FR02] . Non-anticipative strategies were introduced by [FS02b; KO02; Ben92; KS99a]. Hence, in this game, one of the players chooses his control and the other player responds by selecting a control according to some strategy.
Definition 4.4. A non-anticipative strategy on [t, τ S ] for Player I is a measurable mapping which we shall denote by α s.th.: α : [t, τ S ] × Ω × T to U and for any stopping time τ : Ω → T and any F −measurable player II stopping times ρ 1 , ρ 2 ∈ T with
We define the Player II non-anticipative strategy β : [t, τ S ] × Ω × U → T analogously. Hence, α and β are Elliott-Kalton strategies.
We denote the set of all non-anticipative strategies for Player I (resp., Player II) by A (t,τs) (resp.,B (t,τs )).
Remark 4.5. The intuition behind definition 4.4 is as follows: suppose player I uses the control u 1 ∈ U and the system follows a path ω and that player II employs the strategy β ∈ B (t,τs) against the control u 1 . If in fact player II cannot distinguish between the control u 1 and some other player I control u 2 ∈ U then controls u 1 and u 2 induce the same response from the player II strategy that is to say β(u 1 ) ≡ β(u 2 ).
Note that when U is a singleton the game is degenerate and collapses into a classical optimal stopping problem for player II with a value function and solution as that in ch.3 in [KW00] . Similarly, when T is a singleton the game collapses into a classical impulse control problem for player I with a value function and solution as that in ch.7 in [KW00] .
Definition 4.6. Suppose we denote the space of measurable functions by H, suppose also that the function φ : [t, τ S ] × R p → R p s.th. φ ∈ H. Let τ ∈ [t, τ S ] and ρ ∈ T be F − measurable stopping times; we define the [non-local] Player I-intervention operator M : H → H acting at τ by the following expression:
where Γ : R p × Z → R p is the impulse response function defined earlier. Remark 4.7. Suppose that the value of the game exists and that we denote the value by V . If V ∈ H, then the term MV (s, x) that is, the non-local intervention operator M acting the value function associated to the game, represents the value of the player I strategy that consists of performing the best possible intervention at some given time s ∈ [t, τ S ] when the state is at x ∈ R p , then performing optimally thereafter. Suppose τ ∈ [t, τ S ] is some intervention time then the equality MV (τ, x) = V (τ, x) holds at the points of intervention ∀x ∈ R p , we note however, that an immediate intervention may not be optimal; that is we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.8. Suppose that the value of the game V exists and that V ∈ H, then the nonlocal intervention operator M satisfies the following inequality pointwise ∀(s, x) ∈ [t, τ S ]×R p :
We give a statement of the following result without proof: Lemma 4.9.(Lemma 3.10 in [Mk07] ) The non-local intervention operator M is continuous wherein we can deduce the existence of a constants c 1 , c 2 > 0 s.th. ∀x, y ∈ R p and s < s ′ with s, s
A proof of the result is reported in [Mk07] .
Stochastic Differential Games of Impulse Control and Stopping
We now study the zero-sum case of the game. The following theorem provides the conditions under which, if a sufficiently smooth function can be found then we have the value function of the game. Thus the following verification theorem characterises the conditions in which the value of the game satisfies a HJBI equation.
We will later use the conditions of Theorem 5.1 in a practical sense to derive the optimal investment strategy for the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin model presented in section 7.
Theorem 5.1. [Verification Theorem for Zero-Sum Controller-Stopper Games with Impulse Control] Suppose the problem is to find φ(x) and (û,ρ) ∈ U × T s.th. for all x ∈ [t, τ S ] × R p :
where if (û,ρ) ∈ U × T exists, it is an optimal pair consisting of the optimal control for player I and the optimal stopping time for player II (resp.). Let τ be some F −measurable stopping time and denote byX(τ ) = X(τ − ) + ∆ N X(τ ), where ∆ N X(τ ) denotes a jump at some F τ −measurable time τ due toÑ . Suppose that the value of the game exists. Denote by X(s) ≡ X(s, ·), ∀s ∈ R and φ ≡ φ(·, X) ≡ φ(X), f (·, X) ≡ f (X) ∀X ∈ S.
Suppose also that there exists a function φ that satisifies technical conditions (T1) -(T4) and the following conditions:
(ii) φ ≤ Mφ on S and φ ≥ G(X) on S and the regions D 1 and D 2 are defined by: D 1 = {X ∈ S; φ(X) < Mφ(X)} and D 2 = {X ∈ S; φ(X) > G(X)} where we refer to D 1 (resp., D 2 ) as the player I (resp., player II) continuation region.
(iv)
Putτ 0 ≡ t and defineû := [τ j ,ξ j ] j∈N inductively by:
, then (û,ρ) ∈ U × T are an optimal pair for the game, that is to say that we have:
for all x ∈ [t, τ S ] × R p . Theorem 5.1 provides a characterisation of the value of the game in terms of a dynamic programming equation (which is simply the non-linear PDE in (iv)). In particular, Theorem 5.1 says that given some solution to the non-linear PDE in (iv), then this solution coincides with the value of the game from which we can calculate the optimal controls for each player.
Before stating the proof of Theorem 5.1, we make the following set of remarks which also applies to Theorem 5.3.:
Remark 5.2. For the jump-diffusion process considered here, by Lemma 3.7 in [CG14] we can automatically conclude thatξ k ∈ argmin z∈Z φ(Γ(
where τ k is an F −measurable stopping time exists for the game considered here.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we firstly require the following result: Theorem (Approximation Theorem) (Theorem 3.1 in [KW00]) LetD ∈ S be an open set and let us assume that X(τ S ) ∈ ∂S and suppose that ∂D is a Lipschitz surface. Let ψ :S → R be a function s.th. ψ ∈ C 1 (S) ∩ C(S) and ψ ∈ C 2 (S\∂D) and suppose the second order derivatives of ψ are locally bounded near ∂D; then there exists a sequence of functions We are now in a position to prove the theorem; some ideas for the proof come from [EBY11b] and [IW81] : Proof of Theorem 5.1.
Let us fix the player I controlû ∈ U and let us define ρ m = ρ ∧ m; m = 1, 2 . . .. By Dynkin's formula for jump-diffusion processes (see for example Theorem 1.24 in [KW00]) we have:
Summing (32) from j = 0 to j = k for some 0 < k < µ (t,ρm) (û) − 1 (recall the definition of µ (t,s) (u) from definition 4.1) and observe that using (iv) we have that -(∂ s + L)[φ] = f , hence we have that:
Now by definition of the non-local intervention operator M and by choice ofξ j ∈ Z, we have that:
hence after deducting φ(X t,x0,û (τ − j )) from both sides we find:
), (35) and by (vi) we readily observe that: φ(X t,x0,û (τ s ))−φ(X t,x0,û (τ s )) = 0, hence after plugging (35) into (33) we obtain the following:
Note that our choice ofξ k ∈ Z induces equality in (36).
Since the number of interventions in (36) is bounded above by µ (t,ρm∧τS) (û) ∧ m for some m < ∞ and (36) holds for any k ∈ N, taking the limit as k → ∞ in (36) gives:
Now lim m→∞
s. whenτ j = τ S , we can then deduce the statement by Lemma 4.9 i.e. using the Hölder continuity of the non-local operator M. Similarly, we have by
we can exploit the quasi-left continuity of X (for further details see [MDG10] (Proposition I.2.26 and Proposition I.3.27)) and the continuity properties of f , we find that there exists some c > 0 s.th.:
Hence, taking the limit as m → ∞ and using the Fatôu lemma and (37), we find that:
where we have used that
c(τ j ,ξ j ) = j≥1 c(τ j ,ξ j ) · 1 {τj≤ρm∧τS} . Since this holds for all ρ ∈ T we observe that:
After which we easily deduce that:
For the second part of the proof, let us fix ρ ′ ∈ T (t,τS) as in (v) and define: 
Hence,
Now by definition of M we find that:
Subtracting φ(X t,x0,u (τ − j )) from both sides of (44) and summing and negating, we find that:
Inserting (45) into (43) gives:
Then letting k → ∞ in (46) gives:
Again, using the quasi-left continuity of X we find that:
we have that: lim m→∞
Moreover, as in part (i), using the fact that ρ D (m) ∧ τ S → ρ D ∧ τ s as m → ∞, we can deduce the existence of a constant c > 0 s.th.:
Moreover, using (vi), we observe that:
Hence, by the dominated convergence theorem after taking the limit m → ∞ in (47) we find that:
Since this holds for all u ∈ U we have that:
from which clearly we have that:
where we observe that by (50) and (39) we can conclude that:
However, since for all u ∈ U, ρ ∈ T and x ∈ R p we have: inf u∈U (sup ρ∈T J (u,ρ) (x)) ≥ sup ρ∈T (inf u∈U J (u,ρ) (x)). Moreover, choosing u =û in (51), by (iv) we find equality, hence:
from which we find that:
and hence we deduce the thesis. Corollary 5.3. The sample space splits into three regions that represent a region in which player I applies impulse interventions I 1 , a region for player II stops the game I 2 , and a region I 3 in which no action is taken by neither player; moreover the three regions are characterised by the following expressions:
6 Stochastic Differential Games of Impulse Control and Stopping with Non-Zero-Sum Payoff
In this section, we study the game as studied in section 5, however we now extend the results to a non-zero-sum stochastic differential game. The results of this section are loosely based on [KZ08] where we make the necessary adjustments to accommodate both impulse controls and the action of the stopper. We start by proving a non-zero-sum verification theorem for the game in which both players use impulse controls to modify the state process and lastly adapt the impulse controller-stopper game in section 5 to the non-zero-sum setting.
Suppose firstly that the uncontrolled passive state
, F , P 0 ) as in sections 2 and 3. We decouple the objective performance functionals so that we now consider the following payoff functionals:
ξ j ∈ Z are F −measurable intervention values ∀ j ∈ N and u ∈ U is an admissible controls for player I. The cost functions c 1 and c 2 share the same properties as c in section 2; we assume also that the functions G 1 and G 2 are Lipschitz continuous and bounded.
We can observe the functional J (u,ρ) 1 (x) (resp., J (u,ρ) 2 (x)) defines the payoff received by the player I (resp., player II) during the game with initial point x ∈ [t, τ S ] × R p when player I uses the control u ∈ U and player II decides to stop the game at time ρ ∈ T .
Since we are now handling a game with a non-zero-sum payoff structure, we must adapt the definition of the non-local intervention operator M 1 : H → H (c.f. definition 4.6) to
, τ is some F −measurable stopping time and as before, γ : R p × Z → R p is the impulse response function. Definition 6.1. [Nash Equilibrium] We say that a pair (û,ρ) ∈ U × T is a Nash equilibrium of the stochastic differential game with impulse controls u(s) = j≥1 ξ j · 1 {τj<τS} (s) ∈ U for all s ∈ [t, τ S ] if the following statements hold:
∀ ρ ∈ T and ∀ x ∈ [t, τ S ] × R p . Condition (i) states that given some fixed player II stopping timeρ ∈ T , player I cannot profitably deviate from playing the control policyû ∈ U. Analogously, condition (ii) is the equivalent statement given the player I's control policy is fixed asû, player II cannot profitably deviate fromρ ∈ T . We therefore see that (û,ρ) ∈ U × T is an equilibrium in the sense of a Nash equilibrium since neither player has an incentive to deviate given their opponent plays the equilibrium policy.
As in [Mk07] , we generalise our zero-sum Theorem 5.1 to cover non-zero-sum payoff structure with the use of a Nash Equilibrium solution concept.
As in the zero-sum case, we can give a heuristic motivation of the key features of the verification theorem for the game when the payoff structure is non-zero-sum by studying the complete repertoire of tactics that each player can employ throughout the horizon of the game (see supplementary material).
Theorem 6.2. [Verification Theorem for Non-Zero-Sum Controller-Stopper Games with Impulse Control] Let τ j , ρ ∈ T be F −measurable stopping times. Denote by X ·,u ≡ X for any u ∈ U and suppose that there exist functions φ i , i ∈ {1, 2} s.th. conditions (T1) -(T4) hold (see appendix) and additionally:
(ii') φ 1 ≥ M 1 φ 1 on S and φ 2 ≥ G 2 (X) on S and the regions D 1 and D 2 are defined by: D 1 = {X ∈ S; φ 1 (X) > M 1 φ 1 (X)} and D 2 = {X ∈ S; φ 2 (X) > G 2 (X)} where we refer to D 1 (resp., D 2 ) as the player I (resp., player II) continuation region.
and
Proof As in the proof of Theorem 5.1, let us fix the player II controlρ ∈ T ; we firstly appeal to the Dynkin formula for jump-diffusions, hence for X = X ·,u we have the following:
Summing (61) from j = 0 to j = k for some k : t < τ k+1 <ρ implies that:
Now by (iii') we have that:
Hence inserting (63) into (62) yields
Or equivalently:
We now use analogous arguments to (44) -(45). Indeed, by definition of M 1 we find that:
After subtracting φ(X t,x0,u (τ − j )) from both sides of (66), summing then negating, we find that:
After inserting (67) into (65) we find that:
Defineρ m ≡β m (u) =ρ ∧ m; m = 1, 2 . . .. As in the zero-sum case, since the number of interventions in (68) is bounded above by µ (t,ρm∧τS )(u) ∧ m for some m < ∞ and (68) holds for any k ∈ N, taking the limit as k → ∞ in (68) gives:
Now, lim m→∞
Thus, after taking the limit m → ∞ in (69) and noting that by definition, lim m→∞ρm =ρ, we have that:
Since this holds for all u ∈ U we find:
Hence, we find that ∀x ∈ [t,
Now, applying the above arguments with the controls (û,ρ) yields the following equality
the process I 2 and a region in which no action is taken by either player I 3 ; moreover the three regions are characterised by the following expressions:
The Optimal Liquidity Control and Lifetime Ruin Problem
We now revisit the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin problem in section II and solve the model presented in section 2. In the following analysis, we use the results of the stochastic differential game of impulse control and stopping to solve our model. Before stating results, using (14) and (2), we firstly make the following observation on the stochastic generator L θ which is given by the following expression (s, x, y, q)
We now restate Theorem 7.1: Theorem 7.1. Suppose that the firm's liquidity process x evolves according to (2) and suppose that the investor's wealth process y evolves according to (5) then the sequence of optimal capital injections (τ ,Ẑ) ≡ [τ j ,ẑ j ] j∈N ≡ j≥1ẑ j · 1 {τj≤ρ∧T } (s) is characterised by the investment times {τ j } j∈N and magnitudes {ẑ j } j∈N where [τ j ,ẑ j ] j∈N are constructed recursively via the following expressions:
where the process Q is determined by the optimal choice ofθ = (θ 0 ,θ 1 ) and the set D 1 (non-stopping region) is defined by:
where the operator Lθ corresponds to the stochastic generator of the controlled process. From Theorem 7.1 we immediately arrive at the following result: Corollary 7.2. For the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin problem, the investor's wealth process x lies within a space that splits into three regions: a region in which the investor performs a capital injection -I 1 , a region in which no action is taken -I 2 and lastly a region in which the investor exits the market by selling all firm holdings -I 3 . Moreover, the three regions are characterised by the following expressions:
where q is the value of the process Q and the fixed duplet (ỹ,ŷ) and the value ω * are determined by (21) - (23) and (171) respectively.. Theorem 7.3. The investor's problem reduces to the following double obstacle variational inequality:
where G(s, ·) = e −δs (g 1 xq + λ T + g 2 y). The investor's optimal stopping timeρ ∈ [t, T ] is given by:
where the set D 1 is the investor's non-stopping region defined by (28). Theorem 7.1 and Theorem 7.3. are underpinned by the following results: Lemma 7.4. The optimal choice ofθ = (θ 0 ,θ 1 ) corresponds to the measure Q which is defined by:
and the process Q is determined by the expression ∀ s ∈ [t, T ]:
whereθ 1 is a solution to the equation H(ψ) = 0 where H is given by:
where Ξ(ψ) := (1 −θ 1 (z))(1 + γ f (z))) and k is a solution to (91).
The following result provides a complete characterisation of the investor's value function: Proposition 7.5 The value function ψ for the investor's (joint) problem (10) -(11) is given by:
where the functions φ 2 and φ ω are given by (93) -(94).
where a, d 1 , d 2 and ω * are constants given by (156) -(158). Proposition 7.5 provides a complete characterisation of the value function for the investor's problem. where given some φ ∈ H the intervention operator M 1 φ is given by:
for all (s, y) ∈ [t, T ] × S 2 × R and the stopping timeρ is defined by:
Our first task is to characterise the value of the game. Now by the conditions of Theorem 5.1, we observe that the following expressions must hold ∀ s ∈ [t, T ]:
Now using (97) -(100) we find that the generator is given by the following expression: 
By (111) and (112) we readily deduce that the first order condition onθ 0 is given by the following expression:θ 0 y 2 3
which after some simple manipulation we find that:
Now by (vi) of Theorem 5.1 we have that on
(here f = 0) which implies that:
Let us try as our candidate function ψ(y) = e −δs y 3 [φ 2 (y 2 ) + φ ω (ω)], where ω := y 1 y 3 . Then after plugging our expression for ψ into (118) we find that:
and (115) now becomes:θ
Hence, substituting (120) into (119) we find that:
Additionally, our first order condition onθ 1 becomes:
where Ξ(θ 1 ) :
Note that by combining (99) with (120) we immediately arrive at Lemma 7.4. We can decouple (121) after which we find that when y ∈ D 1 ∩ D 2 we have that:
We can solve the Cauchy-Euler equation (124) -after performing some straightforward calculations we find that:
for some (as yet undetermined) constants c 1 and c 2 and the constants d 1 and d 2 are given by:
Since ψ(t) = Y 2 (t) = 0, we easily deduce that c 2 = −c 1 , after which we deduce that φ 2 is given by the following expression:
where c := c 1 = −c 2 is some as of yet undetermined constant.
To obtain an expression for the function φ ω , in light of (128) we conjecture that φ ω takes the form:
where a and k are some constants. Using (129) and (123), we find the following:
where the operator L q is defined by the following expression for some function φ ∈ C 1,2 ([t, τ S ], R):
and p(k) is defined by:
where Ξ(θ 1 ) := (1 −θ 1 (z))(1 + γ f (z))). Note that using (129) the first order condition onθ 1 (c.f. (122)) now becomes:
Hence using (133), (132) becomes:
We now make the following observations:
using condition (103). We therefore now deduce the existence of a value z ∈ (0, 1) s.th. p(z) = 0. We now conclude that ∀ y 3 ∈ R, y 1 ∈ S we have that:
where a is an arbitrary constant and where k is a solution to the equation:
We now split the analysis into two parts in which we study the investor's capital injections (impulse control) problem and the investor's optimal stopping problem separately. We then later recombine the two problems to construct our solution to the problem. The Investor's Capital Injections Problem We firstly tackle the investor's capital injections problem, in particular we wish to ascertain the form of the function φ 2 and describe the intervention region and the optimal size of the investor's capital injections.
Our ansatz for the continuation region D 2 is that it takes the form:
D 2 = {y 2 >ỹ 2 , |y 2 ,ỹ 2 ∈ S}.
Therefore by (ii) of Theorem 5.1 for y 2 / ∈ D 2 we have that ψ(s, y) = Mψ(s, y) = inf{ψ(s, y 1 , y 2 − ζ, y 3 ) + (κ I + α I ζ), ζ > 0} ⇐⇒ φ 2 (y 2 ) = inf{φ 2 (y 2 − ζ) + (κ I + α I ζ), ζ > 0}.
Let us define the function h by the following expression:
h(ζ) = φ 2 (y 2 − ζ) − (κ I + α I ζ).
Hence we see that the first order condition for the minimaζ(y 2 ) ∈ Z of the function h is
Let us now consider a unique pointŷ 2 ∈ (0,ỹ 2 ) s.th.:
andŷ 2 = y 2 −ζ(y 2 ) or ζ(ŷ 2 ) =ŷ 2 − y 2 .
Then, after imposing a continuity condition at y 2 =ỹ 2 , by (139) we have that φ 2 (ỹ 2 ) = φ 2,0 (ŷ 2 ) − (κ I + α I (ŷ 2 −ỹ 2 ))
where φ 2,0 (y 2 ) = φ 2 (y 2 ) on D 2 where φ 2 is given by (128). Additionally, be construction of y 2 we have that: φ ′ 2 (ỹ 2 ) = α I .
Hence we deduce that the function φ 2 is given by the following expression: Our ansatz for the continuation region D 1 is that it takes the form:
D 1 = {ω = y 1 y 3 < y * 1 y * 3 = ω * |y 1 , y * 1 ∈ S, y 3 , y * 3 ∈ R}
If we assume that the high contact principle holds, in particular if we have differentiability at ω * then, using (129) we obtain the following equations:
(ii) akω * k−1 = g 1 , by continuity and differentiability at ω * . Since the system of equations (i) -(ii) completely determine the constants a and ω * , we can compute the values of ω * and a in (129), after which we find:
The Investor's Value Function and Joint Problem Using (100) and (120) we now see that the process Y 3 is determined by the expression:
P−a.s., whereθ 1 is determined by the equation (c.f. (133)):
where Ξ(θ 1 ) := (1 −θ 1 (z))(1 + γ f (z))). Using Itô's formula for Itô-Lévy processes, we can solve (150), moreover since 
where the stochastic generator Lθ is defined via the following expression: 
and where the constants a, ω * , d 1 , d 2 are determined by (156)-(158) and the constants c,ŷ,ỹ are determined by the set of equations:
(167)
We therefore immediately arrive at the following result: The following lemma provides a complete charactersation of the value function for the investor's problem when the liquidity process contains no jumps: Lemma 7.6. For the case in which the investor's liquidity process contains no jumps (i.e. γ f ≡ 0 in (2)) we can obtain the following (closed analytic expression) for the function ψ: ψ(s, x, y, q) =        e −δs q{φ 2 (y) − q −1 (κ I + α I (ŷ − y)) + φ ω (xq))}, S\∂D 2 e −δ(T ∧ρ) (g 1 xq + λ T + g 2 y), S\∂D 1 qe −δs (φ 2 (y) + φ ω (xq))
where the function φ 2 is given by (93) and the function φ ω is given by the following: ∀ x ∈ S, q ∈ R:
where k, a and ω * are given by:
